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Persistence and Change in Regional Security 
Institutions: Does the OAS Still Have a Project? 
BRIGITTE WEIFFEN 
This article follows the recent trend of bringing the Organization of American States (OAS) 
back into the debate on regional security, previously dominated by the accomplishments of 
European institutions and the shortcomings of their Asian and African counterparts. The 
study of the OAS is advanced here through application of an analytical framework derived 
from institutionalist theory. A security organization may change its form during its lifetime 
and pursue different kinds of tasks. The oldest regional security institution, the OAS was 
designed for collective security. This yielded to collective defence during the Cold War, and 
to cooperative security in the 1990s. After 11 September it returned to collective defence, 
but the contradictory reassertion of United States leadership and the emergence of South Amer-
ican regional power made hemispheric cooperation more difficult again. The ~AS's main 
achievement is the extension of essential principles - democracy, human rights, and peaceful 
conflict resolution - to the entire hemisphere. As a diversified institution addressing a wide 
variety of security challenges, however, the OAS must find a coherent project alongside 
more focused sub-regional organizations such as the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR). 
Introduction 
Regional security organizations have been part of the institutional framework for the 
management of international security since the 19th century, but only after World 
War II did they gain official recognition as part of the international institutional archi-
tecture. With the end of the Cold War, the debate on regionalism and regional organ-
izations acquired new relevance. However, while there are a number of established 
approaches to conceptualize regional security, the development of a framework to 
analyse the evolution and performance of regional security organizations is a very 
recent endeavour. 
The Organization of American States (OAS) is the world's oldest regional secur-
ity organization. It dates back to 1890, when the first of nine International Confer-
ences of American States created the International Union of American Republics, 
which was renamed the Pan American Union in 1910. World War II set the stage 
for the creation of a regional security framework. At the last International Conference 
of American States in 1948 in Bogota, 21 governments signed the Charta of the 
Organization of American States. Between 1967 and 1984, the nations of the 
English-speaking Caribbean joined, followed by Canada (in 1990) and Belize and 
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Guyana (in 1991). The OAS currently encompasses all 35 independent states in the 
western hemisphere. 
This article contributes to the burgeoning literature on comparative regional 
security studies as well as to a better understanding of security challenges in 
today's multi-actor and multipolar world. Particularly, it follows the recent trend 
of bringing the OAS back into a debate on regional security dominated by the accom-
plishments of European institutions on the one hand and the difficulties and shortcom-
ings of their Asian and African counterparts on the other. The article advances the 
study of the OAS through the development and application of an analytical frame-
work derived from institutionalist theory. So far, the role of the OAS in the 
domain of peace and security has been studied in Spanish and Portuguese and, to a 
lesser extent, English through descriptive narratives and often from the angle of 
anti-hegemonic approaches. The most recent contributions either present a broad 
overview of the OAS as a multifunctional organization I or focus their attention on 
the latest phase of institutional evolution.2 
In contrast, this article explores the security policies of the OAS across different 
historical phases and traces the changes undergone in terms of the organization's 
policy programmes, operational activities, and information activities after the end 
of the Cold War and after 9/11. From an institutionalist perspective, the institutional 
evolution of international organizations reflects shifts in actors' preferences, because 
international organizations are created to serve the interests of states, to encourage 
cooperation among states, and to reduce transaction costs. The foreign policy priori-
ties of the actors and their visions of regional relations are decisive in shaping the 
mandate and role of a regional organization. 
Nonetheless, actors are both inspired and constrained by structural conditions. 
The transformations in the international environment following the historical water-
sheds of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the terrorist attacks against the United States 
were background conditions that prompted the adaption of international organiz-
ations to the new world political scenario. A more constant feature influencing the 
capacity of regional bodies is the issue of hegemony. The predominance of a 
member state in terms of political, economic, or military capacity is a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, there is the danger that a hegemonic power seizes 
the decision-making apparatus and renders the organization paralysed or abuses it 
to advance its national interests. On the other hand, the weight of a hegemon can 
be positively employed to bring about consensus and to provide resolute leadership. 3 
This article will follow the Organization of American States' historical trajectory 
and will show that the organization's mission changed over time. Beginning with a 
brief summary of alternative regional security approaches, the first part of the 
article develops a framework for an assessment of regional security organizations' 
activities. It draws on the institutionalist debate on the design of international organ-
izations and policymaking within such entities and devises three types of highly insti-
tutionalized security institutions as well as a classification of policy output. It is 
argued that looking at the policy output of an organization and its priorities in security 
governance helps to determine the type of security organization. An underlying 
assumption is that a security organization may change its form from one type to 
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another during its lifetime and might also pursue different tasks at the same time. The 
second part of the article applies these analytical tools to the OAS. It explores which 
policy outputs the Organization of American States produced during the Cold War, 
during the first decade following the end of the Cold War, and after 9/11, and high-
lights the security functions that prevailed in each of the phases of the organization's 
evolution. While its initial goals were both mutual defence against attacks from 
outside the hemisphere and the pacific settlement of disputes between member 
states - tasks it could fulfil only to a limited extent due to the constraints imposed 
by the Cold War and US hegemony - it shifted its focus towards cooperative security 
in the course of its reactivation in the 1990s. After the terrorist attacks of 11 Septem-
ber 2001, however, the OAS experienced a renewed emphasis on collective defence 
and hence a partial return to the strategic framework of the Cold War. The article's 
conclusion will discuss the prospects for its further development. 
Regional Security Organizations: A Toolbox for Analysis 
The 'wave of regionalism' since the 1990s has inspired a range of approaches con-
ceptualizing regional security. These studies map favourable conditions for the main-
tenance of regional peace and explore the ties binding together states at a regional 
level; they discuss pathways to security communities or security order, and power 
as exercised through regional security complexes. Adler and Barnett revitalized 
Karl Deutsch's concept of security communities from a constructivist point of 
view, and identified various levels of intensity of security communities as well as 
indicators to determine the type of security community.4 Lake and Morgan presented 
the concept of regional orders where the decisive aspects binding together a region 
are so-called security externalities, that is, common security threats and risks a 
group of states faces.5 Regional security complex theory, in turn, highlights the 
importance of geographical proximity. 6 All of these approaches look at a broader 
concept of regionalism or the dynamics of regional cooperation. On a rather abstract 
level, they point to patterns of enmity or amity within a region that result from terri-
toriality, common interests, or shared values. 
Further analyses examine the emergence and the patterns of regional and sub-
regional organizations or regional approaches to conflict management in comparative 
perspective, but offer only selective evidence on individual organizations.7 Addition-
ally, the notions of regional security architecture and regional security governance are 
used to characterize the security practices of particular world regions. 8 The bulk of 
the comparative studies on regional security organizations scrutinizes their contri-
bution to global governance and hence focuses on their interaction with the UN 
when sharing tasks and responsibilities in conflict management.9 However, for a 
long time the evolution and performance of regional security organizations as such 
have hardly been studied. 
Only very recently have attempts been made to develop an analytical framework 
for a systematic comparative assessment of regional organizations with a security 
mandate. In his book published in 2010, Tavares derives his analytical insights 
from the literature on the cooperation of regional security organizations with the 
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UN in the realm of peace and security and compares the organizational capacity and 
operational experience of 11 regional organizations in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the 
Americas. IO The contributions to the volume edited by Kirchner and Dominguez and 
published in 2011 cover a slightly different sample of organizations from the trans-
atlantic area, the western hemisphere, Asia, and Africa. 11 The editors provide an elab-
orate framework to assess the rationale, goals, and principles of ten regional security 
organizations, their institutional provisions, and their performance along four dimen-
sions of security governance: assurance, prevention, protection, and compellence. 12 
As the case study chapters show, however, these dimensions are highly hetero-: 
geneous and encompass threats of a very different nature, such as traditional 
threats from outside the region and conflicts between member states, conflicts and 
political crises within member states, and non-traditional, transnational threats to 
public and citizen security. A major shortcoming of an analyttcal tool allowing for 
such a wide variation of issues is that it complicates the tracing of changes in organ-
izational priorities over time. In fact, the case studies collected by Kirchner and Dom-
inguez concentrate on the current state of the regional organizations. 
This article devises more parsimonious analytical categories in order to be able to 
capture the transformation of mandate, institutional form, and performance of 
regional security organizations over a long period of time. For that purpose, it 
draws on the institutionalist debate concerning the form, function, persistence, and 
change of security institutions. 13 Inspired by reflections on the role of NATO after 
the end of the Cold War, institutionalist scholars examined the fate of alliances 
once their precipitating threats disappear. They hypothesized that highly institutiona-
lized entities are more likely to persist than non-institutionalized ones and that more 
complex institutions that were faced with a variety of tasks from the outset are more 
likely to adapt to changes in the environment. 14 
An institution's mission might be quite obvious when figuring prominently in its 
Charter or other key documents. Often, however, international institutions do not live 
up to their promise or in fact have to cope with problems not yet existent or relevant at 
the time of the institution's inception. A more detailed scrutiny of an institution's 
mission and its transformation over time triggered by environmental conditions or 
historical events and induced by crucial actors is hence useful to capture its evolution-
ary dynamics. This article proposes to look at international institutions' policy output 
in order to determine the principal task they fulfilled at a particular moment in time. 
Hence, I conceptualize policy output as symptom, or manifestation, of an institution's 
mission. 
Varieties of Security Institutions 
To classify the changing tasks of regional security organizations, three types of highly 
institutionalized security coalitions are adapted from a typology introduced by Wal-
lander and Keohane. 15 The three-dimensional typology includes the degree of insti-
tutionalization, the situation the state is facing, and participation criteria. With respect 
to the latter, coalitions can be inclusive, meaning that they involve those states that 
pose threats or risks, or can deliberately exclude them. Situation refers to the type 
of security challenge: a coalition is facing a threat if certain actors have the 
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capabilities to harm the security of others and are perceived as willing to do so by 
their potential targets. The coalition's norms, rules, and procedures enable the 
members to identify threats and retaliate effectively against them. In turn, when 
states are facing risks, no actor has the intention or the capability to harm the security 
of others, and hence no imminent threat exists. The coalition's norms, rules, and 
procedures help the members to obtain information and to manage disputes in 
order to avoid generating security dilemmas. 
When concentrating on highly institutionalized security coalitions, three types of 
institutions can be distinguished: 16 (1) collective defence arrangements, also known 
as alliances; (2) collective security arrangements; and (3) cooperative security 
arrangements, also termed security management institutions. Each type is expected 
to lay emphasis on a different set of tasks. 17 
Collective Defence Arrangements. Collective defence arrangements or alliances are 
exclusive security institutions designed principally to deal with threats from non-
members. Based on a pact of mutual military assistance between the member 
states, they deter and defend against common external threats and counter external 
aggression. 
Collective Security Arrangements. Collective security arrangements are inclusive 
security coalitions that maintain order among member states, contain and integrate 
potential aggressors into the institution's system of norms and rules, and punish 
non-compliance. The scope of applicable measures ranges from mechanisms for 
the peaceful settlement of disputes to collective enforcement. A wide variety of econ-
omic and diplomatic sanctions as well as armed force may be utilized for enforce-
ment, while the peaceful settlement of disputes comprises both non-binding 
intervention in the form of preventive diplomacy, good offices, mediation, concilia-
tion, or fact finding, and binding intervention in the form of arbitration or 
adjudication. IS 
Preventive diplomacy is 'action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, 
to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of 
the latter when they occur'. 19 In most cases, it consists of diplomatic efforts, some-
times coupled with economic sanctions or arms embargoes, or the threat thereof. 
By means of the good offices technique, the Secretary General of the United 
Nations or a regional organization facilitates communication channels for the disput-
ing parties in order to enable them to speak to each other without officially entering 
into negotiations. An international organization might also form a commission of 
inquiry that is sent to the countries involved in the dispute to clarify the situation. 
Mediation is a mode of official negotiation in which a third party helps the conflict 
parties to arrive at a solution they cannot find by themselves.2o It may involve per-
suading the parties to accept mediation in the first place or include multiple mediators 
over time, for different phases of a conflict and search for settlement. 
Adjudication and arbitration involve referring a dispute to an impartial third party 
tribunal for a binding decision. These methods seek to find a basis for settlement in 
international law rather than in a political or diplomatic process. However, they can 
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be used only if states consent to submit a dispute and be bound by the outcome. 
Arbiters or arbitration panels are usually selected ad hoc from a list of potential inter-
national arbitrators (lawyers, judges, diplomats, academics, or former government 
officials). Adjudication, in turn, takes place at an international court, usually the 
International Court of Justice. 
Situated in between mechanisms of peaceful settlement and military enforcement, 
peacekeeping operations require the consent of the target country. Although peace-
keeping as long-term deployment of military and/or civilian personnel is still a 
domain of the UN, regional organizations have become increasingly active and 
have carried out observation and monitoring activities, and have sent civilians or 
even troops to help restore peace and security in areas of recent conflict. 
Arms control mechanisms are an additional feature of collective security arrange-
ments. Often enough, the aim of limiting, controlling, and reducing the means for 
waging war is a major reason for their foundation. International institutions not 
only produce treaties and conventions but might also establish safeguard systems 
of inspections and collect information on military expenditures of their member 
states. Confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) form part of the arms 
control framework. They are reciprocated measures that enhance mutual understand-
ing, convey non-hostile intentions, define acceptable norms and behaviour, and hence 
reduce the potential for military surprise. 
Cooperative Security Arrangements. Cooperative security arrangements or security 
management institutions aim at the promotion of peaceful change based on agreed-
upon norms, rules, and procedures. Cooperative security relies on information 
exchange, transparency, and communication by means of international institutions. 
This type of cooperation is feasible when there is no manifest threat to address, but 
states are instead facing risks inside or outside the coalition. 
Risks might result from rivalries that are mostly spatial, positional, or ideological 
in nature. Other contested issues might include the treatment of ethnic minorities or 
dissidents, or the control over resources.21 These issues, however, by themselves do 
not suffice to trigger war. Cooperative security arrangements mitigate these latent 
tensions by means of CSBM that tend to be of a higher intensity than those employed 
by collective security organizations. They reduce or, ideally, eliminate the causes of 
distrust and tensions. Hence, CSBM are the main tool to move from the logic of con-
frontation to the logic of cooperation.22 Political instability constitutes a risk as well. 
Cooperative security organizations might therefore provide instruments that contrib-
ute to the solution of political crises and the support of democratic processes. CSBM 
are also related to democratization, because they are useful devices to manage civil-
military relations in countries that, after a period of military rule, are still in the 
process of consolidating democratic institutions. 
The tasks that the different types of institutions fulfil are not mutually exclusive; 
institutions might combine a variety of functions. Wallander and Keohane call those 
institutions that combine risk-directed management functions with threat-directed 
power aggregation functions 'hybrid' institutions.23 NATO, for example, while pri-
marily designed as an alliance to deter a Soviet attack, also served the purpose of 
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controlling Germany and hence effectively functioned as a collective security 
arrangement. 
In addition to challenges to international security, all three types of security 
organizations increasingly have to cope with non-traditional challenges, such as 
terrorism, organized crime (drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, contraband, human 
trafficking, and so on), guerrillas and insurgencies, illegal migration, and natural 
and manmade disasters, whose shared feature is that they are transnational III 
nature and challenge international and domestic security at the same time. 
Policy Output of Security Institutions 
Most of the research on policy processes in international organizations looks at 
economic organizations or exclusively focuses on the UN and European examples 
such as the OSCE and NATO.24 However, the analytical categories developed in 
those studies can be applied to a wider sample of regional security organizations. 
This analysis focuses on the policy output and differentiates between three types of 
output: policy programmes, operational activities, and information activities.25 
Policy Programmes. Policy programmes are sets of norms and rules. The policy pro-
gramme output of international organizations consists of treaties, declarations, and 
resolutions - in other words, the legal framework they provide to regulate the inter-
actions among member states and between member states and the international organ-
ization itself, or to guide the organization's external behaviour?6 An important 
feature of policy programmes in the field of security cooperation is their binding 
nature. Although the degree of legal obligation does not necessarily correlate with 
the level of member states' compliance, it is important to consider whether the 
norms and rules are legally binding obligations or mere declarations and recommen-
dations. International conventions, treaties, and agreements are designed to become 
legally binding for member states. This requires ratification by the state parties. 
However, resolutions and declarations of regional organizations' plenary organs 
usually have recommendatory character. They may be of a highly symbolic value, 
though. 
Operational Activities. Once a policy programme is designed and norms and rules 
are formulated, the next step is their implementation. That is why a large part of 
the output takes an operational form. Rittberger and Zangl distinguish five types of 
operational activities:27 the specification and concretization of the norms and rules 
of policy programmes; their active implementation through the international organ-
ization itself; monitoring of their implementation by member states; adjudication 
in cases of disputes about member states' non-compliance; and the imposition of 
sanctions in case of non-compliance. Operational activities typically comprise the 
creation of specialized bodies and organizations and the set-up of norm enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Information Activities. The third type of output is information actiVIties, which 
accompany and have an impact on both programme decisions and operational 
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activities. International organizations act as agencies for the collection and publi-
cation of information relevant to their mission. Some independently generate infor-
mation and knowledge: they fund research projects, request expertise from 
scientific institutes, or coordinate research activities in the member states. Addition-
ally, they function as forums for information exchange about the topic the organiz-
ation is concerned with, and offer members the opportunity to get to know the 
other states' positions and perceptions. 
Persistence or Change? The Organization of American States 
Guided by the analytical categories outlined above, this section scrutinizes the chan-
ging tasks of the Organization of American States (OAS) and affiliated organizations 
of the inter-American security system. So far there have been three broad phases in 
the history of the OAS.28 The first phase lasted from the late 1940s to the 1980s, cor-
responding to the Cold War. The prevailing logic of this period reflected the pre-emi-
nence of the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union on a 
global scale. Second was the post-Cold War era, characterized by the transformation 
of threats into risks. The third phase has taken shape in response to the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11. The US unleashed a 'war on terror' that, comparable to the clash 
between communism and capitalism, came to dominate the global agenda. The 
following sections will trace how these exogenous changes impacted on the foreign 
policy preferences of OAS member states and, accordingly, the main tasks of the 
OAS during each of the three phases. 
The OAS during the Cold War 
Policy Programmes. The OAS Charter, the Pact of Bogota, and the Rio Treaty were 
the original pillars of the hemispheric security system. In its Article 2, the OAS 
Charter affirms that one of the central purposes of the organization is 'to strengthen 
the peace and security of the continent' , and conflict resolution was among its funda-
mental goals.29 Chapter V of the Charter envisions the creation of means for pacific 
settlement of disputes, and according to Chapter VI, the organization defines itself as 
a system of collective security. An additional instrument to regulate conflicts between 
American states was the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, or Pact of Bogota, 
signed in 1948 along with the OAS Charter. It established principles and procedures 
for dispute settlement including mediation, good offices, investigation, and referral to 
the International Court of Justice. 
As a consequence of World War n, the Inter-American Conference on the Pro-
blems of War and Peace (1945) called for a collective response to aggression 
against any American state. In 1947, at a conference in Rio de Janeiro, this idea 
took shape in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or the Rio 
Treaty, which defines an attack on one state as an attack on all. Since its main task 
was to deal with military aggression originating from outside the region, it created 
a regional collective defence arrangement. The Rio Treaty had already been signed 
before the foundation of the OAS, but was incorporated into the OAS Charter as a 
security instrument applicable to those OAS member states that ratified it. 
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Other hemispheric security institutions include the Inter-American Defense 
Board (IADB). The IADB was founded in 1942 to coordinate the defence of the 
Americas during World War II and brought together military representatives. In con-
trast to the Rio Treaty, it did not become part of the OAS structure after 1948. In the 
decades following World War II, the IADB had hardly any significance, as the 
member states did not want to equip it with operational capacity and many OAS 
member states are not even members of the lA DB. 
During the Cold War, the task of arms control and disarmament was most emi-
nently addressed outside the ~AS. The Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zone, established by the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelo1co, dates back to the 1962 Cuban 
missile crisis and the sense of alarm created among states of the region that a super-
power nuclear confrontation might occur on their soil. 
Operational Activities. Several of the organs devised by the founders of the OAS 
have the mandate to monitor and assist in dispute settlement. Any party to a 
dispute may resort to the Permanent Council to obtain its good offices (Article 85, 
OAS Charter), which can be delegated to the Secretary General. The Meeting of Con-
sultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is designed to consider problems of an urgent 
nature (Article 61, OAS Charter). This organ does not meet on a regular basis, but can 
be convoked upon request. 
In its early phase the OAS had some success in preventing conflicts from escalat-
ing, such as the repeated tensions between Costa Rica and Nicaragua or the territorial 
dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua. The mediation of the dispute between El 
Salvador and Honduras in 1969, known as the 'Soccer War', is considered the clear-
est expression of the organization's conflict resolution capacities.3o Starting in the 
1960s, however, states were increasingly divided on the issue of intervention, and 
the next two decades (1970-1989) saw the OAS security activities in decline. The 
organization was unable to respond to several conflicts in the region, such as the Mal-
vinas/Falklands War in 1982 where the US backed the position of its NATO ally 
Great Britain rather than Argentina's, and internal wars in Central America through-
out the 1980s, where an ad hoc coalition, the Contadora (later, Rio) Group, had to be 
formed to support the peace process. 
Most importantly, the OAS could do little to restrain US unilateral efforts. Fol-
lowing the Cuban Revolution, Latin America turned into 'both a battleground and 
a prize in the conflict between communism and capitalism' .31 The concept of national 
security was at the top of the US agenda and overshadowed all other foreign policy 
goals. Repeatedly, the US government backed anti-communist authoritarian regimes 
in the region and supported the overthrow of democratically elected governments.32 
In some of those cases, the US referred to the principle of non..:intervention in order to 
legitimize their activities, arguing that they were defending the target state's sover-
eignty against the intrusion of international communism.33 The strategic framework 
of the Cold War consisted in the monopoly of the US government to define the exter-
nal threat. Latin American governments began to perceive the OAS as an institution 
hijacked by the US to advance its national interests and affirm its hegemonic status. 
The Rio Treaty suffered the same fate. Its invocation merely consisted in declarations 
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of solidarity, but never led to common action. Its credibility as a security instrument 
was undermined by incidents like the United States' active participation in the 1954 
overthrow of the Guatemalan government and its 1962 Santo Domingo invasion. 
Discussion and Evaluation of Output. According to its founding documents, the 
OAS aimed at collective security and collective defence. But although its normative 
foundations enabled the organization to address both threats from outside the hemi-
sphere and disputes between the American states, operational and information activi-
ties remained weak. The Cold War was not a uniform phase, though. Initially, the 
organization's operational activities did mitigate conflicts in the region. But increas-
ingly, US unilateral action in its crusade against communism and its instrumentaliza-
tion of the OAS paralysed the organization so that it remained largely inactive during 
the 1970 and 1980s. 
The OAS collective defence provisions had emerged in response to the threats 
posed by World WarII. In the context of the Cold War, a revamped version reflecting 
the United States' mission to contain communism became the dominant doctrine. As 
such, it led the United States to extend and consolidate their political supremacy 
throughout the hemisphere. The US emphasis on collective defence hampered the 
proper functioning of the OAS collective security provisions. For example, the con-
flict resolution mechanisms outlined by the Pact of Bogota were never applied. 
The OAS in the 1990s 
The end of the Cold War signified a change in the international environment that, on 
its part, reshaped actors' preferences. In Latin America, the demise of communism 
coincided with a period of democratic transition and consolidation. Recently demo-
cratized regimes are particularly likely to join and collaborate in international insti-
tutions. 34 In turn, the democratization of their member states transforms pre-existing 
international organizations. Democracies set up or strengthen 'inter-democratic' 
organizations, which are more effective in reducing the risks of militarized inter-
state conflict among their members than other kinds of international organizations. 35 
Hence, democratization in the region provided an incentive to transform the ~AS. 
Additionally, the dynamics of inter-American relations changed. In the post-Cold 
War period, anti-communism no longer served as the guiding principle, a change that 
opened up new room for the United States' longstanding rhetorical support for 
democracy to be put into greater operation.36 At the same time, a redefinition of 
the concept of regional security was necessary. Security challenges became more 
dynamic, resilient, and diverse. On the one hand, traditional security threats were 
still relevant. Throughout the 20th century, the region experienced a number of mili-
tarized inter-state disputes and strategic rivalries, some of which still exist. 37 On the 
other hand, many of the new challenges to regional security were transnational in 
nature and arose from problems like organized crime, migration, and environmental 
degradation. Additionally, in the course of transitions to democracy, the civilian 
control of the military and the collective defence of democracy were perceived as 
security challenges. 38 
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Policy Programmes. The 1991 meeting of the OAS General Assembly in Santiago, 
Chile, is considered a turning point in regional relations. In the 'Santiago Commit-
ment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System', the member 
states envisioned an adaptation to the changed political environment after the end 
of the Cold War. Therefore, reforms of the existing institutions were initiated 
during the 1990s, and several new legal instruments and implementation mechanisms 
were created within and outside the framework of the ~AS. Overall, in the 1990s the 
emphasis moved away from collective defence to cooperative security. Confidence-
and security-building measures (CSBM) became an increasingly important topic. Since 
1992, the annual General Assembly passed resolutions encouraging the member states 
to carry out CSBM and to share information on the implemented measures. 
Instruments designed for the support of democratic processes and the defence of 
democracy in times of political crisis can also be interpreted as means for conflict pre-
vention and conflict resolution. 39 The Santiago Commitment emphasized the member 
states' 'inescapable commitment' to the defence of democracy in the region, and the 
accompanying Resolution 1080 set up procedures of collective action in the case of a 
'sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of 
the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government' of a 
member state. The 1992 Protocol of Washington amended the OAS Charter, granting 
the organization the authority to suspend a member state whose democratically 
constituted government is overthrown by force.4o 
Concerning the traditional security mission of the inter-American system, the 
1990s saw an ongoing debate over whether the Rio Treaty and the Inter-American 
Defense Board were still needed. Due to its inactivity, observers from many 
member states considered the Rio Treaty's collective defence provisions obsolete. 
Yet from the perspective of some other states, among them the US, the Rio Treaty 
should stay in force.41 The same schism reigned concerning the IADB. Some 
countries viewed it as an outdated Cold War exercise in military diplomacy. 
Others, like Argentina and Canada, proposed to integrate it into the OAS structure 
and turn it into a tool for security management.42 Due to these divergent opinions, 
no reform attempts were made for the time being. 
In contrast to the Cold War period, legal instruments for arms control were 
created inside the OAS framework: the Inter-American Convention against the 
Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and 
other Related Materials (1997) and the Inter-American Convention on Transparency 
in Conventional Weapons Acquisition (1999). 
Operational Activities. The most significant institutional innovation in regional 
security management was the establishment of the Committee on Hemispheric Secur-
ity (CHS). It came into existence in 1992 as a special commission to redefine the 
concept of security, as suggested by the Santiago Commitment, and was turned 
into a permanent organ in 1995. The agenda of the CHS is determined by the Perma-
nent Council, which instructs the CHS to take action on those General Assembly res-
olutions that pertain to hemispheric security. In order to enact the General Assembly 
resolutions on CSBM, a first Meeting of Experts on this topic took place in Buenos 
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Aires in 1994. Subsequently, the regional conferences on CSBM in Santiago (1995) 
and San Salvador (1998) issued suggestions on how to undertake concrete steps 
towards confidence building.43 
During the 1990s, the OAS turned into an active defender of democracy. Already 
in 1990, Canada had taken the lead in creating a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy 
(UPD) , which carried out numerous election observation missions.44 Resolution 
1080, which opened the possibility to condemn an unconstitutional interruption of 
democratic rule, was invoked four times during the 1990s: after the coup in Haiti 
in 1991, in reaction to President Alberto Fujimori's 'self-coup' (autogolpe) in Peru 
in 1992 and a similar autogolpe in Guatemala in 1993, and in Paraguay in 1996 in 
the middle of a civil-military crisis with the credible threat of a coup. 
The OAS also addressed non-traditional security challenges. Drug trafficking is 
the oldest and most persistent one, as is illustrated by the fact that the Inter-American 
Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) had already been created in 1986. In the 
1990s, new provisions regarding money laundering were issued. Terrorism figured on 
the hemispheric security agenda after the bomb attacks on the Israeli Embassy and a 
Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994, respectively. The heads 
of states held a Special Conference on Terrorism in 1996, and a follow-up meeting 
created the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), which was set 
up in 2001. 
Additional steps to deepen cooperation in the western hemisphere were taken 
outside the OAS framework. The First Summit of the Americas, held in Miami in 
1994, was interpreted as a signal of departure from US unilateralism and towards a 
commitment to . democracy in the region.45 However, security issues were not part 
of the agenda. This is why a separate Defense Ministerial of the Americas Meeting 
was convoked in Williamsburg, USA, in 1995. Subsequent meetings took place in 
Bariloche, Argentina (1996), Cartagena de Indias, Colombia (1998), Manaus, 
Brazil (2000), Santiago, Chile (2002), Quito, Ecuador (2004), Managua, Nicaragua 
(2006), Banff, Canada (2008), and in Santa Cruz, Bolivia (2010). The tenth confer-
ence is scheduled to take place in Punta del Este, Uruguay, on 8-10 October 2012. 
Information Activities. In the course of the ~AS's reactivation, a pattern of continu-
ous exchange amongst experts from the national defence and foreign affairs bureauc-
racies, national representatives at the OAS headquarters, and OAS personnel 
emerged. Particularly via the CHS, member states share sensitive information on 
defence spending, weapons acquisition, and on CSBM carried out in the region. 
While not taking binding decisions, the Defense Ministerial of the Americas is an 
additional discussion forum in which current issues in hemispheric security and 
defence policies can be addressed. 
Discussion and Evaluation of Output. For the OAS, the end of the Cold War was a 
watershed. In Latin America, the organization had for a long time been experienced 
as an instrument employed by the United States to convey their national agenda. The 
end of the Cold War abol~shed the strategic framework whose main rationale was the 
fight against communism. Democratic transitions in most Latin American countries 
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as well as the worldwide resurgence of regionalism were additional factors that led to 
a revival of the inter-American security system.46 However, there is a mixed picture 
with respect to normative and institutional development during the 1990s. While the 
majority of innovations took place in the field of cooperative security, reforms in the 
fields of collective defence and collective security were only partly achieved. 
The changing strategic framework involved a shift from collective to cooperati ve 
security. The tasks of dissuasion and deterrence were substituted by an emphasis on 
the creation of higher levels of mutual trust by CSBM, which guarantee the transpar-
ency of military procedures and the availability of information.47 However, the 
~AS's most significant institutional innovation was its defence of democracy 
regime. The fact that member states placed a strong emphasis on the possibility to 
intervene in protection of representative democracy in times of crisis signals a shift 
in priorities, putting less emphasis on the traditional principles of non-intervention 
and state sovereignty. 48 
In contrast, hardly any reforms of the pre-existing normative and institutional fra-
mework were accomplished, and as progenies of the Cold War, its components 
appeared increasingly outdated. As demonstrated by the examples of the old Inter-
American Defense Board and the new initiative of the Defense Ministerial of the 
Americas, consultations on defence policy often were initiated outside the ~AS. 
Some observers interpret this as an expression of Latin American persistent mistrust 
towards the US after their hijacking of the OAS during the Cold War.49 Hence, in the 
1990s, the future of the OAS as a regional security organization was still undefined, 
which was mainly attributable to the US role in the hemisphere. 50 Power asymmetry 
between the United States and the rest of the region remained an outstanding charac-
teristic and met with a lack of coordination of Latin American states vis-a-vis the 
neighbour in the north. The relative irrelevance of Latin America in US global secur-
ity considerations became increasingly obvious. US regional policy concentrated on 
economic issues, with market opening and hemispheric integration under the aegis of 
neoliberalism as the main goals. 51 
The OAS after 9/11 
While democratization and economic transformation were the main concerns in the 
western hemisphere during the 1990s, the inter-American system in the new millen-
nium was shaped by the external shock of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and political 
changes within the region, conducive to the contradictory trends of a reassertion of 
US hegemony and the emergence of regional powers. George W. Bush's war 
against terrorism diverted US security policy priorities to the Middle East and 
Central Asia so that Latin America almost dropped from sight. 52 The US restricted 
its engagement in the region to some topics directly affecting its national interests, 
such as illegal migration, the fight against drug trafficking, and terrorist threats. 
At the same time, Latin American states are increasingly reluctant to follow 
Washington's lead in multilateral forums. Some, like Venezuela, Bolivia, and 
Ecuador, openly oppose the United States; a few, like Colombia, closely cooperate 
with the US on a bilateral basis; and others, like Brazil, foster diversified relations 
in the international arena. Brazil and Venezuela compete for the role of regional 
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powers, and both. of them pursue projects of South American integration as part of 
their strategy of expanding their political influence. On the Brazilian side, the most 
important step was the initiation of a Community of South American Nations in 
2004, later turned into the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). On the 
part of Venezuela, President Chavez initiated the Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Peoples of Our America (ALBA), which started out as an explicitly anti-hegemonic 
bilateral agreement between Venezuela and Cuba and was later joined by a number 
of like-minded left-wing governments. 
Policy Programmes. In reaction to 9/11, the OAS passed a resolution to strengthen 
cooperation in the prevention of and the fight against terrorism. In June 2002, the 
member states signed the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, which 
offers a legal framework for cooperation efforts and information exchange. The 
need to clarify the mandate of the IADB and its relationship to the OAS had repeat-
edly been articulated in the 1990s. After the 2003 Special Conference on Security, the 
CHS formed the 'Working Group to Conclude the Analysis of the Juridical and Insti-
tutional Link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defense Board'. The new sta-
tutes of the IADB were approved in March 2006 and confined the Board to technical 
advisory services in the area of military and defence, while not performing functions 
of an operational nature. Typical activities include mine clearing, reporting on 
CSBM, and the development of educational programmes on regional security. 
At the same time, the policy programmes initiated in the 1990s continued in the 
new millennium. To comply with the call for a thorough review of regional security, 
the Special Conference on Security was held in Mexico City in 2003. The conference 
adopted the Declaration on Security in the Americas, which affirms the countries' 
political will to help preserve peace through close cooperation and presents a multi-
dimensional concept of security, including 'traditional and new threats, concerns, and 
other challenges to the security of the states of the hemisphere' .53 Apart from tra-
ditional security threats, like territorial and boundary disputes, the Declaration pre-
sents an enumeration of new challenges to security, such as terrorism, drug 
trafficking, arms trade and contraband, migration, and natural disasters. The list 
also includes aspects of public safety. Genuine socio-economic problems like 
poverty and diseases are defined as security risks. The novel thing about those 
non-traditional challenges is that governments increasingly realize their transnational 
scope and impact as well as the involvement of non-state actors. 54 Critics argue that 
the inclusion of a broad range of security concerns renders the term diffuse and limit-
less, and point to the dangers of an amalgamation of military and police tasks. 55 
However, its supporters claim that the multidimensional concept exerts an integrative 
function, as it represents the wide range of security problems relevant for the different 
SUb-regions, and they emphasize the principle of collective security, which guaran-
tees that states assist each other in dealing with the various challenges. 56 
As well as the reconceptualization of hemispheric security, the beginning of the 
new millennium saw a deepening of the defence of democracy regime. On 11 
September 2001, the OAS adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter.57 With 
it, the OAS broadened its conception of what constitutes a democratic crisis to 
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include not only irregular interruptions of the democratic political institutional 
process, but also any 'unconstitutional alteration of the democratic order', a phrase 
applying specifically to undemocratic actions of democratically elected leaders. 
Operational Activities. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks collective defence once again 
became an issue in the hemisphere. The United States initiated its war on terror, 
which resembled the strategic framework of the Cold War. 58 Once again, the US 
determined the enemy and even attempted to redefine pre-existing security chal-
lenges, in particular guerrilla warfare and drug trafficking, as part of the new 
phenomenon. 59 Consequently, several of the traditional instruments that had been 
used for the last time in the Cold War period were reactivated. In response to the 
terrorist attacks of September 2001, the US invoked both the Rio Treaty and the 
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 
At the same time, the Latin American states, for most of whom terrorism was not a 
major concern, focused on the consolidation of the security management institutions 
created in the 1990s and emphasized collective security. Following the Declaration 
on Security, the General Secretariat created the Secretariat for Multidimensional 
Security as one of its sub-units in 2005. Initially it only functioned as secretariat of 
the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) and the Inter-American 
Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) and concentrated on public security, but 
in 2011 a new Department of Defense and Hemispheric Security was set up. 
Having fulfilled its original mission to formulate a new concept of security, the 
Committee on Hemispheric Security persisted as the primary forum for discussion 
of both traditional and newly emerging security challenges. These are reflected in 
its annual work plan and calendar of activities. 60 The CHS holds sessions on disarma-
ment and non-proliferation and hosts the meetings of the state parties of the Inter-
American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. 
Regular meetings and working groups address public security, transnational orga-
nized crime, the problem of criminal gangs, and natural disaster reduction and risk 
management. Additionally, the CHS follows up on other security-related OAS 
activities, such as the work of CICTE and CICAD. 
In 2003 another Meeting of Experts on CSBM took place in Miami. Building on 
the previous Declarations of Santiago and San Salvador, the Consensus of Miami 
contains an 'Illustrative List of CSBM' which attempts a systematic classification 
of CSBM into diplomatic and political measures, educational and cultural measures, 
and military measures. The experts also recommended using the CHS as a forum for 
the topic of CS BM. Accordingly, the CHS started to convene as the Forum on 
Confidence- and Security-Building in April 2005; subsequent Forum meetings 
were held in November 2006, March 2008, and November 2010. 
In the area of the defence of democracy, new mechanisms were created and 
applied for the first time. Under the umbrella of the Department of Sustainable 
Democracy and Special Missions, which addresses both inter-state territorial contro-
versies and internal, political-institutional conflicts, the OAS initiated a Special 
Program for the Promotion of Dialogue and Conflict Resolution. This programme 
coordinated a number of special missions, for example to Bolivia, where it came 
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into play during the electoral process after President CarIos Mesa had resigned in the 
context of political and social upheaval in 2005, Ecuador where it assisted with the re-
establishment of the Supreme Court of Justice, Haiti where it provided technical 
assistance for the 2006 elections and Nicaragua where it facilitated dialogue after 
intra-governmental conflict. The Inter-American Democratic Charter was invoked 
for the first time in 2002. Pursuant to Article 20 of the IADC, the OAS condemned 
the coup against Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and sent a high-level mission to the 
country to support dialogue between the adversary political forces. The Charter 
was also activated following the ouster of President Manuel Zelaya of Honduras in 
2009 - the first time that, in accordance with the defence of democracy regime, a 
member state was suspended. 
From the start of the new millennium, the OAS once again became more active in 
the field of collective security and created instruments for conflict resolution. The 
Peace Fund was established in 2000 to address territorial disputes. From 1999 to 
2003 it brokered agreements in the border disputes between Belize and Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua, and El Salvador and Honduras. After the 2005 restructuring 
of the General Secretariat, the Peace Fund is now administered by the Department of 
Sustainable Democracy and Special Missions, which is part of the Secretariat for 
Political Affairs. The first OAS peacekeeping mission, consisting of a staff of 
more than 100 civilian experts, was established in 2004 to support the peace 
process in Colombia.61 In 2008, a good offices mission was set up after the incursion 
of Colombian military forces and police personnel into the territory of Ecuador. The 
two most recent Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs also 
addressed disputes between member states: the Colombian - Ecuadorian border 
crisis (March 2008), and the situation in the border area between Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua (December 2010). 
Information Activities. The ever-expanding information activities of the OAS in the 
field of security mainly relate to security management and arms control and are coor-
dinated by the CHS. As of 2009, most member states complied with their obligation 
to provide a report on their acquisitions of conventional weapons under the Inter-
American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition. The 
CHS is in charge of monitoring and evaluating the implementation of all types of 
CSBM, publishes a Roster of Experts in CSBM, and considers new variants, for 
example CSBM between internal security forces in order to cope with transnational 
security challenges. Additionally, the new IADB statutes mandate the Board to offer 
consultative services on CSBM of a military nature and to keep an inventory of 
CSBM.62 A remarkable feature of the ~AS's information activities is its transparency 
vis-it-vis NGOs and the general pUblic.63 Thanks to its comprehensive web site, the 
texts of treaties and declarations and detailed information on operational activities, 
such as the agenda of the CHS, and even on sensitive topics like reporting on 
defence expenditures, are easily accessible. 
Discussion and Evaluation of Output. After 9/11, the gap between US interests in 
security policy and the concerns of the rest of the region widened.64 From the 
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perspective of the United States, collective defence once again became the top pri-
ority. In terms of US Latin American policy, there is a continuity of logic between 
Cold War approaches and the current situation. Instead of anti-communism, the 
war on terror became the most important foreign policy goal, and the US tried to 
seize the decision-making apparatus of the OAS to promote their national agenda 
and urge other states to partake in its mission. 65 
Simultaneously, the OAS continued its trajectory towards security management. 
By means of its Declaration on Security, the organization identified new security 
challenges in the region. At the same time, it addressed traditional security threats 
in the framework of its CHS and even accomplished the transformation of an outdated 
collective defence arrangement (the IADB) into a security management forum. In 
comparison to the operational activities of the 1990s, significant progress occurred 
in the field of conflict resolution mechanisms, with the Latin American states in 
the driving seat. By creating the Peace Fund and establishing the administrative struc-
ture of the Department of Sustainable Democracy and Special Missions, the OAS 
accomplished a more autonomous stance in collective security. Moreover, the OAS 
expanded its information activities and established itself as a venue used by policy-
makers for discussion and direct information exchange. 
Some caveats are in order, however, when assessing the recent performance of the 
OAS. The contradictory US policy towards Latin America has led to mounting 
disappointment of Latin American states with hemisphere-wide institutions and to 
the emergence of new sub-regional organizations, which have recently been more 
successful in conflict management than the OAS. During its 2008 summit, the Rio 
Group settled the dispute caused by the border skirmish between Ecuador and 
Colombia, while UNASUR played a key role as a mediator in the 2008 secession 
crisis in Bolivia and the diplomatic crisis between Colombia and Venezuela in mid 
2010. In direct competition with the CHS, UNASUR established the South American 
Defence Council as a cooperative security arrangement designed to enhance 
multilateral military cooperation, promote CSBM, and foster collaboration of 
defence industries. 
Conclusion: Does the OAS Still Have a project? 
When looking at the policy output during the three different phases examined in this 
article, the contrasts are striking. During the Cold War, the OAS basically maintained 
the normative framework that had been set up in the aftermath of World War 11. In 
turn, in the comparatively short time period after the end of the Cold War, numerous 
new policy programme initiatives were adopted. Much more often than before, they 
were followed by appropriate operational activities. Additionally, policy programmes 
and operational activities were complemented by an increasing amount of infor-
mation activities. In particular, the communications revolution with the spread of 
the worldwide web contributed to an intensification of information exchange. 
Overall, the OAS exhibits elements of collective security, collective defence, and 
cooperative security arrangements. But the focus of its mission shifted over time, and 
this shift was linked to the special features of the respective phases and the resulting 
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policy preferences of key actors. The Cold War period was characterized by recurrent 
divergence of US and Latin American foreign policy orientations and security 
concerns. The hegemonial power emphasized collective defence against the external 
threat of communism. The doctrine of anti-communism formed the legitimatory basis 
for US interventions in the region. US unilateralism contradicted and hampered a 
collective security approach: The OAS could not address US interventions ade-
quately, and due to fear of hegemonic interference, the mitigation of intra-regional 
conflict was often undertaken by ad hoc coalitions. 
The 1990s were a period of multilateralism and convergence of Latin American 
and US foreign policy preferences. The states unanimously pushed for the renewal of 
the inter-American system, a revision of the concept of security towards a more 
coperative version, and a commitment to the defence of democracy in the region. 
Hemispheric security was more than ever before shaped by the interests of the 
Latin American countries. After the demise of communism an alliance against exter-
nal threats was no longer needed. Comparable to the Cold War era, however, collec-
tive security tasks were usually not addressed by the OAS, but by sub-regional 
coalitions or, in more serious cases such as the 1991 coup in Haiti and the civil 
wars in El Salvador and Guatemala, by.the UN. The OAS focused on the consolida-
tion and defence of democracy as well as on confidence building between former 
rivals. Hence, a cooperative security approach, which is restricted to defining, 
discussing, and monitoring security risks in the region, prevailed during the 1990s. 
The new millennium is once again characterized by a growing rift between US 
and Latin American foreign policy orientations and security concerns. In the inter-
American system, we can observe a somewhat odd coexistence of a re-emergence 
of Cold War dynamics and the continuity of the policy programmes established in 
the 1990s. With its war on terror, the United States shifted its attention back 
towards collective defence in the aftermath of 9/11. In turn, for the majority of 
Latin American countries, international terrorism does not pose an imminent 
threat. However, in compliance with the collective defence paradigm, most states 
chose to cooperate with the US to a certain extent. At the same time, the Latin 
American countries maintain their focus on security management and collective 
security, as evidenced by the discussions on the new multidimensional security 
concept, new initiatives in CSBM, the creation of the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter and conflict resolution mechanisms such as the Peace Fund, and the multipli-
cation of information activities. 
The US-Latin American divergence of foreign policy orientations increasingly 
plagues collaboration in the western hemisphere. This is evidenced by the decay of 
the Summit of the Americas, which at its inception in 1994 symbolized the shift to 
multilateralism in the western hemisphere. The 2009 summit was considered a disap-
pointing event, and at the 6th Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, 14-
15 April 2012, no final declaration was adopted, evidencing the lack of consensus. 
While most Latin American countries sympathized with future Cuban participation 
in the Summit, the United States and Canada were alone in opposing this proposal, 
and they also refused to endorse Argentina's claim to the British-held Falkland/Mal-
vinas Islands. Another contested issue was drug trafficking. Some Latin American 
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leaders pushed for a limited legalization of the narcotics trade in order to contain 
drug-related crime and violence, but the US and Canada, in spite of admitting failures 
in the war on drugs, refused to accept any legalization. What is more, a prostitution 
scandal involving President Obama's Secret Service cast a big shadow over the 
Summit. The image of US government officials taking advantage of the situation 
of Colombian women with few opportunities evoked devastating images of US 
imperialism and exploitation of its southern neighbours. 
Moreover, the position of the OAS as the most institutionalized security organiz-
ation in the region is challenged by sub-regional initiatives. After the establishment of 
the South American Defence Council, UNASUR has emerged as the main contender. 
Other sub-regional organizations, such as Mercosur and the Andean Community, also 
have a security dimension. Whether institutional proliferation and overlapping are 
dangerous or beneficial for regional security governance is an issue of heated 
debate. Tavares considers institutional overlapping to be a nuisance leading to unac-
countability, resource ineffectiveness, and political competition.66 Other authors 
view the coexistence of various institutions more favourably and point to the potential 
benefits of a division of labour.67 A division of labour could work along geographical 
lines or by discerning different types of security challenges. Many problems do not 
necessarily have to be discussed on a hemispheric level, but it might make sense 
to have sub-regional or bilateral institutions addressing some of the heterogeneous 
security concerns in the region. 
The OAS's main achievement was the extension of its essential principles, in par-
ticular democracy, human rights, and peaceful conflict resolution, to the entire hemi-
sphere, and in the future it could concentrate on upholding and defending these 
principles. Its tasks would then include confidence building, institution building, 
and the promotion and defence of the democratic paradigm. In political day-to-day 
business, the OAS functions as a discussion forum, establishes transgovernmental 
networks, enables frequent contacts between officials in security and defence 
policy, and thereby creates awareness of other countries' and sub-regions' security 
concerns. This is a profile very much in line with the concept of cooperative security. 
Additionally, the OAS should also be in charge of threats affecting the whole hemi-
sphere. Thus, it will remain relevant for arms control as well as for the fight against 
transnational threats such as organized crime and terrorism, and may also play a role 
in resolving border disputes. Sub-regional organizations are likely to play a greater 
role in the realm of security as well, both in the field of collective and cooperative 
security. In some cases, the resolution of border disputes and tensions between 
states might work better in a sub-regional environment. The same holds true for 
the resolution of domestic political crises. In several instances, such as the internal 
crisis in Bolivia in 2008, the need for a forum that excludes the United States has 
been identified. However, an explicit division of labour between the OAS and 
UNASUR in these spheres has not been established yet, and the potential develop-
ment of a 'muItilevel security architecture' in the Americas will be an interesting 
subject for further investigation. 
The surprising persistence of an organization repeatedly reputed to be dead con-
firms the basic institutionalist assumption that more complex institutions equipped 
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with a variety of tasks are more likely to adapt to changes in the environment. Ulti-
mately, however, the fate of the OAS depends on the actors' interest in sustaining it. 
Its unique feature is that it facilitates the cultivation of a network of contacts across 
the whole western hemisphere. In order to be able to foster collective action in the 
region, the United States need the OAS, given that there is no alternative institutional 
framework. For Latin American governments, in spite of the mistrust and suspicion 
directed against the hegemonic power, the OAS offers mUltiple opportunities to 
exchange opinions with the US government and relay their views and concerns to 
their northern neighbour. Hence, the fact that it is the only forum to include all sover-
eign American states might be the decisive advantage of the OAS that warrants its 
survival alongside thriving sub-regional alternatives. 
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